Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 31

Issue 2

Article 5

4-1-2014

Evidence, Miracles, and the Existence of Jesus: Comments on
Stephen Law
Robert Greg Cavin
Carlos A. Colombetti

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Cavin, Robert Greg and Colombetti, Carlos A. (2014) "Evidence, Miracles, and the Existence of Jesus:
Comments on Stephen Law," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol.
31 : Iss. 2 , Article 5.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil20146511
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol31/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

EVIDENCE, MIRACLES, AND THE EXISTENCE OF
JESUS: COMMENTS ON STEPHEN LAW
Robert Greg Cavin
Carlos A. Colombetti

We use Bayesian tools to assess Law’s skeptical argument against the historicity of Jesus. We clarify and endorse his sub-argument for the conclusion
that there is good reason to be skeptical about the miracle claims of the New
Testament. However, we dispute Law’s contamination principle that he claims
entails that we should be skeptical about the existence of Jesus. There are
problems with Law’s defense of his principle, and we show, more importantly, that it is not supported by Bayesian considerations. Finally, we show
that Law’s principle is false in the specific case of Jesus and thereby show,
contrary to the main conclusion of Law’s argument, that biblical historians
are entitled to remain confident that Jesus existed.

In his essay “Evidence, Miracles and the Existence of Jesus,”1 Stephen Law
claims that the existence of Jesus is not established by the evidence of the
New Testament, and that there is “good reason to be skeptical” of his existence. He adds, however, that he is also skeptical about the claim that the
Jesus story is entirely mythical, and he acknowledges that the evidence of
the New Testament “may even make Jesus’s existence a little more probable than not.” He presents the following argument, which he does not
fully endorse, but which he says has some prima facie plausibility:
1. Where a claim’s justification derives solely from evidence, extraordinary claims (e.g. concerning supernatural miracles) require
extraordinary evidence. In the absence of extraordinary evidence
there is good reason to be skeptical about those claims.
2. There is no extraordinary evidence for any of the extraordinary
claims concerning supernatural miracles made in the New Testament documents.
3. Therefore (from 1 and 2), there’s good reason to be skeptical about
those extraordinary claims.

1
Stephen Law, “Evidence, Miracles and the Existence of Jesus,” Faith and Philosophy 28
(2011), 129–151.
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4. Where testimony/documents weave together a narrative that combines mundane claims with a significant proportion of extraordinary
claims, and there is good reason to be skeptical about those extra
ordinary claims, then there is good reason to be skeptical about the
mundane claims, at least until we possess good independent evidence of their truth.
5. The New Testament documents weave together a narrative about
Jesus that combines mundane claims with a significant proportion
of extraordinary claims.
6. There is no good independent evidence for even the mundane
claims about Jesus (such as that he existed).
7. Therefore (from 3, 4, 5, and 6), there’s good reason to be skeptical
about whether Jesus existed.2
Premises 1 and 4 are methodological principles that Law labels, respectively, P1 and P2, whereas premises 2, 5, and 6 are empirical assumptions.
He claims that P2, which he calls the contamination principle, entails that we
should remain skeptical about the existence of Jesus, but that other methodological principles popular with biblical historians, such as the criterion
of embarrassment, fail to establish the existence of Jesus as highly probable.
Law deserves credit for writing the most interesting and promising
attempt to cast doubt on the existence of Jesus. Some aspects of his argument have merit—particularly, his principle P1 (when given a Bayesian
interpretation) and step 3 (which he attempts to derive from P1 using
premise 2). Still, there are problems with his main argument, specifically,
with his defense of principle P2. Moreover, we will show below that P2 is
actually false, and that biblical historians are entitled to remain confident
that Jesus existed.
It will be helpful to begin by first laying out the probabilistic machinery
we will be using in our critique of Law’s argument. Let H be any claim,
i.e., any hypothesis. The total evidence or information that is relevant to
H can be divided into (1) statements of those facts that bear as evidence
upon H by virtue of its power to explain them by conferring some degree
of likelihood upon them and (2) statements of those facts that bear (more
directly) as evidence upon H by virtue of making it probable or improbable to some degree, quite apart from the contribution of the former group
of statements. We will call the conjunction of the evidence statements of
the first division E—for facts to be explained—and the conjunction of the
evidence statements of the second division B—for background evidence. The
terminology “background evidence” and “facts to be explained” is meant
only to be suggestive, for the division between B and E is often pragmatic,
depending on the specifics of the case, so that what counts as “background
2
Ibid., 140–141. This is a quotation of Law’s argument except for the omission of the terms
“(P1)” and “(P2)” in premises 1 and 4.
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evidence” and “facts to be explained” is to a significant extent a matter of
convenience.
Belief comes in two complementary kinds: belief as an unqualified state
that is categorically present or absent—so-called “flat-out” belief—and belief as a quantitative/quasi-quantitative state that is a matter of degree—so
called “partial belief.”3 We shall be concerned here only with the latter
except to point out, significantly, that flat-out belief in a proposition is
rational only if rational partial belief in that proposition is greater than 0.5.
It has been shown in this connection by Brian Skyrms (in his reformulation of the pioneering work of Frank P. Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti) that,
in order to be rational, degree of belief must satisfy the theorems of the
probability calculus and be, therefore, probability in this sense and, in particular, epistemic probability—to distinguish it from purely subjective degree
of belief as well as other kinds of probability that do not pertain (at least
directly) to propositions, e.g., relative frequency and propensity.4 In what
follows, accordingly, we will use P( ) to designate epistemic probability, i.e.,
the degree to which it is rational to believe whatever proposition serves as
the argument of the function. In our discussion below we will abbreviate
the term “epistemic probability” by the simpler term “probability.”
Adopting the terminology (but with minor changes in notation) used
by Swinburne, we will call P(H|B&E) the posterior probability of H; P(H|B)
and P(~H|B), respectively, the prior probabilities of H and of ~H; and
P(E|B&H) and P(E|B&~H), respectively, the explanatory powers (likelihoods) of H and of ~H. The posterior probability of H, P(H|B&E), is the
degree of probability it has with respect to the total evidence for it, B and
E. The prior probability of H and of ~H, P(H|B) and P(~H|B), is, in each
case, the degree of probability it has with respect to B alone. And the explanatory power of H and of ~H, P(E|B&H) and P(E|B&~H), is, in each
case, the power the hypothesis has (in conjunction with B) to explain E
(or, rather, the facts it states) in the sense of conferring a certain degree of
likelihood upon it. For this reason we shall use “explanatory power” and
“explanatory likelihood” interchangeably. Bayes’s theorem, to which we
3
For the distinction see Keith Frankish, “Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief,” in Degrees of
Belief, ed. F. Huber and C. Schmidt-Petri (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 75–93.
4
To be rational, of course, degree of belief must be coherent. But as Skyrms shows in his
reformulation of Frank P. Ramsey’s and Bruno de Finetti’s classic coherence arguments: “degrees of belief are coherent if and only if they are finitely additive probabilities,” i.e., satisfy
the axioms of the probability calculus and the definition of conditional probability. See Brian
Skyrms, “A Mistake in Dynamic Coherence Arguments?” Philosophy of Science 60 (1993): 320;
and Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic, 2nd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1975), Chapter I, especially, page 15, Chapter VI, and Chapter VII,
especially, pages 210–222. See also F. P. Ramsey, “Truth and Probability,” in The Foundations
of Mathematics and Other Essays, ed. R. B. Braithwaite (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1931; repr.
in Studies in Subjective Probability, ed. Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. and H. Smokler [Huntington, NY:
Krieger, 1980]); and B. de Finetti, “La prévision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives,”
Annales de l’Institut Henri Poincaré 7 (1937), 1–68. (Translation published as “Foresight: Its
Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources,” in Studies in Subjective Probability, ed. Henry E. Kyburg,
Jr. and H. Smokler (Huntington, NY: Krieger, 1980).
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will turn below, shows how the posterior probability of H can be derived
from the other four probabilities:
P(H|B & E) =

P(H|B) × P(E|B & H)

P(H|B) × P(E|B & H) + P(~H|B) × P(E|B&~H)

.

Let us now consider not some undefined hypothesis H but the specific
claim, which we shall call J, that Jesus existed. What evidence could be
included in B&E to justify a degree of belief that Jesus really existed, i.e.,
to give the probability of interest in our examination of Law’s argument,
P(J|B&E), a value that is significantly greater than 0.5? Four items of
evidence stand out—evidence that skeptics tend to underrate. First, Paul
testifies (Gal. 2:9) that just a few years after the crucifixion he personally
met with Peter, James, and other leaders of the church who claimed to
be the disciples and family of Jesus (some were also martyrs, including
James, who is identified by the same body of testimony as the brother of
Jesus). It seems improbable that Paul lied about this meeting; and, as the
New Testament scholar C. H. Dodd famously quipped, “We may presume
that they did not spend all their time talking about the weather.”5 Second,
one must account for the coherent body of sayings and actions attributed
to Jesus in the gospels, which seem to derive from a single creative and
sagacious personality. The simplest explanation is that they derive from
Jesus himself. To paraphrase an old joke about Shakespeare, if Jesus did
not say and do those things, then someone just like him did. Third, in
addition to the testimony, one must also account for the origin of the Jesus
movement within Judaism and its evolution into the early church, and,
again, the simplest explanation is that it was initiated by Jesus himself
(otherwise, someone just like him). Fourth, the tradition that Jesus was
crucified occurs in Paul and the canonical gospels, but the crucifixion of
someone with messianic pretentions would be a clear stumbling block (or
“embarrassment”) to Jews who accepted the Torah—particularly Deuteronomy 21:22–23, which places God’s curse upon the crucified. It seems
very unlikely that the authors of the gospels would compose stories about
a crucified messiah unless the crucifixion was an undeniable fact. In the
case of this fourth item, we acknowledge that Law has doubts about the
criterion of embarrassment. Of course, it is epistemically possible on B&E
that Jesus did not exist, and, indeed, more than this, since P(~J|B&E) is
not strictly 0—and actually greater than vanishing. Nonetheless, we will
argue below that this evidence can be used to mount a strong cumulative
case in favor of J, giving P(J|B&E) a very high value.
Turning to Law’s argument, we regard his inference of step 3 from
premises 1 and 2 to be sound prima facie. Premise 1, i.e., Law’s principle
5
C. H. Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching and Its Developments, 3rd ed. (London: Hodder &
Stoughton, 1967), 26.
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P1 that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence follows from
probabilistic, and, in particular, Bayesian considerations. We need only
identify, as is entirely natural, “extraordinary claims” with “claims that
have an exceedingly low prior probability,” and “extraordinary evidence”
with “evidence upon which a claim confers an explanatory likelihood that
is exceedingly greater than that conferred upon it by the denial of that
claim.” Law’s thesis in P1 then follows as a consequence of these identities
and Bayes’s theorem. Moreover, and quite significantly, Law’s proviso on
this thesis in P1, namely, “where a claim’s justification derives solely from
evidence,” becomes superfluous and can thus be omitted from P1 in our
Bayesian explication. On such a Bayesian reading, P1 becomes true quite
apart from this. Thus, where H is any extraordinary claim, H will be justified, i.e., it will achieve a probability greater than 0.5, just in case P(H|B&E)
is greater than 0.5—that is, just in case the ratio P(E|B&H)/P(E|B&~H) is
exceedingly high to the same degree that P(H|B) is exceedingly low. In the
absence of extraordinary evidence E, however, the posterior probability
of H will be approximately equal to its prior probability, and, since this
is astronomically low in the case of H as an extraordinary claim, it follows that H cannot be justified apart from the extraordinary evidence for
it provided by E. Although Law ignores opposing arguments advanced
by, e.g., Craig, Licona, Swinburne, and the McGrews, that extraordinary
evidence exists for the miracle claims of the New Testament—specifically
the Resurrection6—we agree with him that premise 2 is correct and have
argued elsewhere that this alleged extraordinary evidence does not exist.7
But let us now examine Law’s contamination principle P2, which he
claims entails that we should remain skeptical about the existence of Jesus.
This is a general epistemic principle regarding testimonial evidence (e.g.,
that given in the New Testament) in which the content of the testimony
satisfies the following four conditions: (a) the narrative/documents contain a number of mundane claims; (b) the narrative also weaves together
the mundane claims with a significant proportion of extraordinary claims;
(c) there is good reason to be skeptical of the extraordinary claims; (d)
there is no good evidence, independent of the testimonial narrative, that
establishes a high probability for the mundane claims. P2, then, can be
paraphrased as the principle that, if conditions (a) through (d) are satisfied
6
William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 3rd ed. (Wheaton,
IL: Crossway books, 2008); Michael R. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical
Approach (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2010); Richard Swinburne, The Resurrection
of God Incarnate (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003); and Timothy and Lydia McGrew, “The
Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth,”
in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland
(Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).
7
We critique Swinburne’s argument in our “Swinburne on the Resurrection: Negative
versus Christian Ramified Natural Theology,” Philosophia Christi 15:2 (2013); we critique the
arguments of Craig and Licona in our “The Resurrection Theory as ‘Best Explanation,’” unpublished manuscript under editorial review; and we critique the argument of the McGrews
in our “The Explanatory Paucity of the Resurrection Theory,” unpublished manuscript
under editorial review.
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by a body of testimony, then there is good reason to be skeptical about
the mundane claims. In the case of Jesus, the mundane claim in question
is that he existed, while the extraordinary claims consist of a number of
miracle stories woven into the narrative of his life, actions, and teaching.
According to Law, some claims (the miracle stories) “contaminate” other
claims (the mundane aspects of the testimony).
Law defends P2 by appeal to our philosophical intuitions. He invents
a story about his close friends Ted and Sarah, who plausibly claim that a
certain Bert came to their home for tea and conversation. So far he believes
them. But now they add that, shortly before leaving, this Bert flew around
the room by flapping his arms, died and resuscitated, and temporarily
changed their sofa into a donkey. In the section “Assessing P2,” Law defends his principle with an argument that can be paraphrased in standard
form as follows:
1. Clearly, in the Ted and Sarah case, the dubious character of the extraordinary, uncorroborated parts of their testimony does contaminate the non-extraordinary parts.
2. So, some sort of contamination principle is correct.
There are three problems that arise for Law’s defense of P2. First, his
argument seems question-begging to the extent that the premise already
seems to rely for its plausibility upon some sort of contamination principle. After all, “does contaminate” in the premise means little if it does
not mean that the parts of the testimony are such that the extraordinary
parts justify doubt about the non-extraordinary parts, in accordance with
some sort of contamination principle. If, to avoid this problem, the argument is rephrased with a weaker premise and P2 itself as the conclusion:
1. Clearly, in the Ted and Sarah case, the dubious character of the extraordinary, uncorroborated parts of their testimony raises some degree of suspicion about the non-extraordinary parts.
2. So, P2 is correct.
then the argument is not question-begging, but now the (weakened)
premise does not adequately support the (strengthened) conclusion. It does
not seem that one’s reasonable philosophical intuitions about the sole case
of Ted and Sarah can support such a broad epistemic principle as P2.
Second, even if our intuitions concur with Law’s and lead us to reasonably doubt the existence of Bert, the assessment of J is not just a matter of
our intuition about the Ted and Sarah case, but also a matter of whether
and to what degree the Ted and Sarah case is a strong analogy to the
apostles and Jesus, so that something like P2 can be deployed. Law characterizes Ted and Sarah (appropriately) as sane and trustworthy individuals
who speak with sincerity and seem genuinely disturbed by what they
believe they witnessed. In other respects, however, the Ted and Sarah case
is a poor analogy to the New Testament—e.g., in terms of the scope of the
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narrative, its sophistication as a wisdom tradition, the rich historical and
social context, a time frame of decades, the opportunity for the accumulation of mythical/supernatural elements around a “mundane” core, and the
willingness of the apostles to accept hardship and even the risk of death
for what they affirmed. One still wonders why miracle claims can’t be
astronomically improbable just on their own—without “contamination”
of the mundane claims. For example, Catholic saints have miracles attributed to them by testimonial evidence. Why should these miracle claims
contaminate testimony regarding their lives? Significantly, our confidence
that these saints existed need not rely upon evidence that is independent
of the testimony.
Third, even in the Ted and Sarah case, if we assume that they are genuinely trustworthy, sane, sober, and sincere, and if they persist in their
insistence that Bert was with them and that he performed miracles, and
if they are joined by additional witnesses who are also willing to endure
hardship for what they claim, then the more probable explanation may
well be that Bert did have tea with them, but that Ted and Sarah were the
victims of an elaborate hoax involving Bert. Law explicitly denies that this
is plausible, but in so doing he in effect confuses what Bayes’s theorem
distinguishes as prior and posterior probabilities: from the fact that such a
hoax is initially improbable, it does not follow that its posterior probability
on the total evidence is low. For example, conspiracy theories, by their
very nature, have very low prior probabilities; yet some conspiracy theories turn out to be true, i.e., have a high posterior probability, by virtue of
their comparatively higher explanatory power in relation to the available
evidence. In general, a very low prior probability can in principle—and in
some actual cases—be overcome by sufficient explanatory power.
Not only do problems arise for Law’s defense of P2, but, more importantly, P2 is not supported by Bayesian considerations and, indeed, we
shall now show that P2 is false in the case of Jesus. Let us reconsider Law’s
statement of P2:
Where testimony/documents weave together a narrative that combines
mundane claims with a significant proportion of extraordinary claims, and
there is good reason to be skeptical about those extraordinary claims, then
there is good reason to be skeptical about the mundane claims, at least until
we possess good independent evidence of their truth.

Now, skepticism is doubt, and doubt, like belief, is a matter of degree, not
an all or nothing affair.8 Indeed, doubt to any degree (e.g., 0.97) in any
proposition (e.g., Jesus rose from the dead) is equal to belief to the same
degree in the denial of that proposition (e.g., Jesus did not rise from the
dead) or, equivalently, to 1 − the degree of belief in that proposition (e.g.,
8
It is true, of course, that “flat-out” belief is not a matter of degree, but it is, nonetheless,
subject to the crucial consistency condition on both kinds of belief, namely, that flat-out belief
in a proposition is rational only when degree of belief in that proposition greater than 0.5 is
itself rational.
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1 − 0.03 = 0.97). And, if the degree of belief/doubt in question is justified,
then we have rational degree of belief/doubt, that is, (epistemic) probability.
Thus P2 must be interpreted in terms of probability.
Now consider any compound claim CM&CE consisting of the conjunction
CM of mundane (“ordinary”) claims 01, … , 0n (e.g., that Jesus existed, that he
was born in Nazareth, and that he was an itinerant preacher who taught
in parables) and the conjunction CE of extraordinary (“miraculous”) claims
M1, … , MK (e.g., that Jesus healed blind Bartimaeus, that he walked on water,
and that he turned water into wine). Let us suppose—as, of course, is true
in the case of Jesus from the New Testament—that there is testimonial evidence for claim CM&CE. We will call our total testimonial evidence for this
claim T and divide this evidence into testimonial evidence TM for mundane
claims CM and testimonial evidence TE for extraordinary claims CE; i.e., T is
TM&TE. Recall from our earlier discussion above that Law states in P1 that,
in the absence of extraordinary evidence for extraordinary claims, there
is good reason to be skeptical about those claims. Recall, moreover, that
Law supposes in premise 2—a supposition we have shown elsewhere to
be justified in the case of Jesus and the New Testament9—that there is no
extraordinary evidence for extraordinary claims CE, and, thus, that TM&TE
is non-extraordinary evidence. Thus, the only evidence for CM and CE is the
non-extraordinary testimonial evidence provided, respectively, by TM and
TE. There is no independent evidence. Consequently, given the soundness
of Law’s argument from P1 and premise 2 to step 3, we can restate the
latter as the conclusion that TM&TE is insufficient to provide extraordinary
claims CE with probability greater than 0.5.
TM and TE can be defined more precisely as follows:
TM: The non-extraordinary testimonial evidence T weaves together a narrative that contains the mundane claims of CM, specifically, 01, … , 0n.10

TE: The non-extraordinary testimonial evidence T weaves together a narrative that contains a significant proportion of the extraordinary
claims of CE, specifically, some subset of M1, … , MK, and combines
these with the mundane claims of CM, specifically, 01, … , 0n.

It is important to observe in this connection that, although TM and TE specify
what particular claims are contained in the narrative woven together by
T, viz., 01, … , 0n in the case of TM and 01, … , 0n and some subset of M1, … , MK
in the case of TE, they do not affirm these claims (even implicitly), and,
See n7.
In order to keep our Bayesian notation simple, we are forcing TM to do “double duty”
in our argument. It contains, accordingly, not only the mundane testimony explicitly stated
in its definition given in the text, but, in addition, non-testimonial evidence consisting of
commonly accepted historical facts of relevance to the mundane claims of the New Testament regarding Jesus, e.g., that Roman crucifixion was reserved for the hardest criminals
and insurrectionists. This additional information could be abbreviated by, say, “F,” and the
conjunction F&TM could be substituted for B in Bayes’s theorem, but we wish to avoid pointless notational complexity.
9

10
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thus, do not entail that they are true. Using these definitions, we can formalize step 3 of Law’s argument in Bayesian terms as the thesis that the
probability of CE on the testimonial evidence TM&TE is not high, i.e., that
P(CE|TM&TE) ≤ 0.5. This says that the absence of extraordinary evidence
for extraordinary claims CE—or, more precisely, that the fact that we possess only non-extraordinary interwoven testimonial evidence TM&TE for
CE—makes it no more probable than 0.5 that CE is true. Of course, this is
also the antecedent of P2 as we restated it above. The consequent, similarly, is the claim that P(CM|TM&TE) ≤ 0.5—which states that the fact that
we possess only non-extraordinary interwoven testimonial evidence TM&TE
for CM makes it improbable (≤ 0.5) that CM is true. Law’s P2, accordingly,
rephrased in probabilistic terms, states:
If P(CE|TM&TE) ≤ 0.5, then P(CM|TM&TE) ≤ 0.5.

This, then, with step 3, yields step 7—which is Law’s conclusion:
P(CM|TM&TE) ≤ 0.5.11
However, P2 is false. We will now show using Bayes’s theorem that,
even if the value of P(CE|TM&TE) is low, the value of P(CM|TM&TE) may still
be high. By substituting CM, TM, and TE, respectively, for H, B, and E in the
schema for Bayes’s theorem given earlier, we obtain the following instance
of Bayes’s theorem:
P(CM|TM&TE) =

P(CM|TM) × P(TE|TM&CM)

P(CM|TM) × P(TE|TM&CM) + P(~CM|TM) × P(TE|TM&~CM)

.

Bayes’s theorem enables us to distinguish between the prior probability
of the mundane claims CM, that is, the probability of CM with respect to
the testimony TM for this alone, and the posterior or final probability of
CM, that is, its probability with respect to our total relevant evidence,
namely, the testimony TM for the mundane claims CM and the testimony
TE for the extraordinary claims CE. The prior and posterior probabilities
of CM are symbolized, respectively, by P(CM|TM) and P(CM|TM&TE). The
term P(~CM|TM) is the prior probability of ~CM, i.e., the denial or negation
of CM, and is equal, by the Negation theorem of the probability calculus,
to 1 − P(CM|TM). Bayes’s theorem, in addition, enables us to distinguish
between the explanatory power of CM, that is, the likelihood that CM, in conjunction with TM, confers on the testimony TE and the explanatory power of
~CM, that is, the likelihood that ~CM, in conjunction with TM, confers on TE.
The explanatory power of CM and of ~CM are symbolized, respectively, by
P(TE|TM&CM) and P(TE|TM&~CM). And the point here is that, in light of these
crucial distinctions made by Bayes’s theorem, it is clear that P2 is false—at
least for the case of Jesus.
11

Note that we have built Law’s premises 5 and 6 into our statements of step 3 and P2.
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Let CM now be, specifically, the mundane New Testament claims
about Jesus—including, in particular, that Jesus existed, i.e., J, and let T
be the total testimonial evidence we have regarding Jesus from the New
Testament. As above, let us divide T into TM and TE. Let TM be mundane
testimony that Jesus existed, went to Jerusalem, was crucified, etc.; and let
TE be testimony for the extraordinary events consisting of Jesus’s healing
and nature miracles, his Resurrection, and his Ascension into Heaven, etc.
Now let us condition on just the partial testimonial evidence TM. Doing so
does not violate the total information requirement because this partial evidence will only be used to get a certain kind of probability, specifically,
the prior probability P(CM|TM). Here, as Law himself must admit, in the
absence of TE and its (allegedly) contaminating effects, CM must have a
very high probability on TM—for every claim in CM is justified by a corresponding very specific item of testimonial evidence in TM. Given only that
evidence, i.e., given only TM, the degree to which it is rational to believe
CM on this basis is very high—at least 0.99, and certainly no less than 0.5.
Law cannot reply here that TE—even though we are not yet considering
it—still contaminates TM. This is because our probabilities are epistemic,
i.e., the degree to which it is rational to believe a hypothesis on the basis
of certain specific information. In other words, here “ignorance” of TE is
bliss. Indeed, even Law agrees that, if the only information about Bert we
got from Ted and Sarah is that he came to their home for tea and conversation, then the degree to which it is rational to believe in Bert’s existence on
this basis is high.
Moreover, there is no contamination, for, as we just saw above, Bayes’s
theorem states that:
P(CM|TM&TE) =

P(CM|TM) × P(TE|TM&CM)

P(CM|TM) × P(TE|TM&CM) + P(~CM|TM) × P(TE|TM&~CM)

.

Thus, Bayes’s theorem enables us to decompose P(CM|TM&TE) into prior
probabilities P(CM|TM) and P(~CM|TM) and explanatory likelihoods
P(TE|TM&CM) and P(TE|TM&~CM). The result is that TM has been “unwoven”
from TE, in that the latter does not occur in the prior probability P(CM|TM)
whereas it does occur in the posterior or final probability P(CM|TM&TE).
Thus, we are now able to deal with P(CM|TM) alone. However, as already
observed above, P(CM|TM) is epistemic probability, and because it only
conditions on the partial information TM, even Law must concede that it
is very high.
Now compare the explanatory likelihoods P(TE|TM&CM) and
P(TE|TM&~CM). Clearly, the former is at least equal to the latter. Indeed, it is
surely much greater: P(TE|TM&CM) ≫ P(TE|TM&~CM). That is, it is much more
likely on the truth of the mundane claims CM of the New Testament about
Jesus (e.g., that he existed, had a ministry, went to Jerusalem, etc.) that we
should get testimony from the New Testament that makes extraordinary
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claims about Jesus than it is on the falsehood of these mundane claims, i.e.,
~CM. This is so because TM includes mundane testimony regarding the humiliation and crucifixion of Jesus, as well as Paul’s testimony that he met
and spoke with Peter, John, and James—presumably about such matters
as the crucifixion. The criterion of embarrassment (which Law has doubts
about) says that, whenever a report (e.g., TM) that defames an alleged
individual, and thus embarrasses devotees and believers, is nonetheless
reported and repeated by them, the claim made by that report (e.g., CM)
is very likely to be true. Reports of the humiliation and crucifixion of the
purported messiah would have been embarrassing in this way because
the crucified are stigmatized as the worst of criminals in the gentile world
and as cursed by God in Deuteronomic law. Even if mythicists were to
protest (absurdly) that the earliest Christian leaders in Jerusalem, e.g.,
Peter, John, and James, and the later New Testament authors had rejected
these Jewish views and embraced a radically new perspective, they cannot
deny that the Jews to whom they preached had not. Moreover, there are
additional items of embarrassing testimony that have a similar impact on
these explanatory likelihoods, including the testimony of Matthew 3:1–17
that John baptized Jesus in a baptism for the repentance and forgiveness
of sins and the testimony of Luke 7:28 that Jesus called John the greatest
born of women. The earliest Christians had no motive to invent and preserve such reports, but would rather have motive to conceal, deny, modify,
and repress them—particularly because they were in competition with the
followers of John.
Let us now plug into Bayes’s theorem the (conservative) prior probability approximations given above, i.e., 0.99 for P(CM|TM) and 0.01 for
P(~CM|TM). We just said above that P(TE|TM&CM) is much greater than
P(TE|TM&~CM). This means, minimally, that P(TE|TM&CM) is 10 times greater
than P(TE|TM&~CM), i.e., that P(TE|TM&CM) = 10 × P(TE|TM&~CM). Thus we
have:
P(CM|TM&TE) =

0.99 × 10 × P(TE|TM&~CM)

0.99 × 10 × P(TE|TM&~CM) + 0.01 × P(TE|TM&~CM)
=

0.99 × 10

0.99 × 10 + 0.01

≈ 0.999.

Of course, Law may protest that the values we have plugged into Bayes’s
theorem are too high. Suppose that we weaken these considerably. Then,
as we shall now see, this move will not help Law, for the posterior probability P(CM|TM&TE) will remain significantly greater than 0.5.
Let’s briefly look at a few examples. Suppose that we assume prior
probability values of 0.75 for P(CM|TM) and 0.25 for P(~CM|TM). Suppose
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also that P(TE|TM&CM) is merely twice the value of P(TE|TM&~CM), i.e., that
P(TE|TM&CM) = 2 × P(TE|TM&~CM). Then we have:
P(CM|TM&TE) =

0.75 × 2 × P(TE|TM&~CM)

0.75 × 2 × P(TE|TM&~CM) + 0.25 × P(TE|TM&~CM)
=

0.75 × 2

0.75 × 2 + 0.25

≈ 0.86.

Suppose Law protests that P(CM|TM) is only 2 × P(~CM|TM) and that the
explanatory likelihoods P(TE|TM&CM) and P(TE|TM&~CM) are equal. Then
even here we get:
P(CM|TM&TE) =

2 × P(~CM|TM) × P(TE|TM&~CM)

2 × P(~CM|TM) × P(TE|TM&~CM) + P(~CM|TM) × P(TE|TM&~CM)
=

2

2+1

≈ 0.66.

One might even suppose, absurdly, that P(CM|TM) is only 1.25 × P(~CM|TM)
and that P(TE|TM&CM) is also only 1.25 × P(TE|TM&~CM). Yet even on these
preposterously low comparative values, we still get a posterior probability of greater than 0.6. Given the strength of the considerations we
have adduced above to justify assigning comparatively high values of 0.99
to P(CM|TM) and 10 × P(TE|TM&~CM) to P(TE|TM&CM), the burden is on Law
to justify assigning either of them (particularly the latter) lower values,
e.g., the value of 1.25 just given to both in the example above. On any
higher values, Law is simply wrong to claim that the evidence of the New
Testament renders the existence of Jesus only (or at best) “a little more
probable than not.”
But, of course, this last observation is a bit anti-climactic. For P(CM|TM)
is certainly very high indeed—at least 0.99—and, thus, the lesson is clear:
since P(TE|TM&CM) is at least equal to P(TE|TM&~CM), and is surely much
greater, i.e., P(TE|TM&CM) ≫ P(TE|TM&~CM), it follows by Bayes’s theorem
that the probability of CM is very high on our total evidence TM&TE. Accordingly, the posterior probability P(CM|TM&TE) is at least 0.99, and surely
much greater.
While there may be no consensus regarding the precise absolute values
that can be assigned to the components of Bayes’s theorem, it is clear nonetheless from our discussion above what the approximate comparative values
must be, and this is sufficient to make our general point: Law is wrong
for all assignments of probability values—except those that are absurdly
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low. This shows that, whatever the exact degree to which P(TE|TM&CM) is
greater than P(TE|TM&~CM), Law’s contamination principle P2 is false in at
least this one very important case—the existence of Jesus—and, thereby,
that the conclusion of Law’s argument, step 7, is false. It shows this because it is clear that, even when we condition on the total evidence that
includes the testimony for extraordinary events, i.e., on TM&TE, the degree
to which it is rational to believe CM, and, thus, J, is still very high. This is
due to Bayesian “unweaving” of the “interwoven” testimonial “strands.”
Law argued that we should be doubtful about the miracle claims of the
New Testament and also, on this basis, that we should be at least somewhat doubtful about the existence of the historical Jesus. We have shown
elsewhere that skepticism of the kind espoused by Law regarding the miracle claims of the New Testament (including the Resurrection) is justified
when the principle that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence is
interpreted in Bayesian terms. Defenders of New Testament miracle claims
have not even attempted to provide the extraordinary evidence required
to show that the explanatory likelihood ratio P(E|B&M)/P(E|B&~M) is
overwhelmingly top-heavy, for any New Testament miracle M—the only
exception being the McGrews, who have tried but failed. However, Law’s
contamination principle P2 is false. Law maintains that the testimony for the
mundane claim that Jesus existed is interwoven with the highly dubious
miracle claims embedded in the rest of the New Testament testimonial
evidence. Our Bayesian argument “unweaves” these “strands” of the total
testimonial evidence and directly challenges the conclusion of Law’s argument, showing (at least prima facie) that P(J|TM&TE) > 0.99.12
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